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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This securities appeal arises from the acquisition of 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. by a group of investors 
led by Whitehall Street Real Estate Limited Partnership V. 
Plaintiffs are former Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. 
shareholders who allege the proxy statement and other 
documents prepared in connection with the acquisition 
were materially misleading because they failed to disclose 
(1) that the Whitehall Group was negotiating to sell roughly 
20% of Rockefeller Center to General Electric following the 
acquisition and (2) that, as a result of the acquisition, the 
Whitehall Group would own transferable development 
rights (air rights) associated with Rockefeller Center.1 The 
District Court granted defendants summary judgment on 
both claims, holding the failure to disclose such 
negotiations and the acquisition of development rights was 
not material. We will vacate and remand its grant of 
summary judgment on plaintiffs' sale negotiations claim 
but will affirm the grant of summary judgment on the 
transferable development rights claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defendants include some members of the Whitehall Group, some of 
their affiliates and former officers and directors of Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc. 
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I. 
 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. was a real estate 
investment trust created in 1985 via a $750 million initial 
public offering of common stock. Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc. used the offering proceeds together with 
$550 million raised through the sale of discounted 
debentures to make a $1.3 billion loan to Rockefeller 
Center Properties and RCP Associates, two partnerships 
(the "Partnerships")2 that at the time owned most of 
Rockefeller Center, in midtown Manhattan. To secure the 
loan, Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. received two 
mortgages on the Partnerships' interests in Rockefeller 
Center. 
 
In the fall of 1994, Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. 
realized it lacked sufficient cash to make upcoming 
debenture payments. In order to avoid default, it signed 
financing agreements with Whitehall Street Real Estate 
Limited Partnership V and Goldman Sachs & Co. Whitehall 
agreed to make a $150 million loan to Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc. in exchange for an assignment of part of the 
Rockefeller Center mortgages, warrants for Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc. stock and "excess" cash. Goldman 
Sachs bought $75 million of Rockefeller Center Properties, 
Inc. debentures in exchange for a seat on Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc.'s board of directors. Goldman Sachs 
subsequently designated defendant Daniel M. Niedich, who 
served as a director until August 1995. 
 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s financial problems 
were soon compounded by the Partnerships' financial 
problems. On May 11, 1995, the Partnerships filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ceased making mortgage 
payments. Realizing that without these payments it would 
soon be unable to meet its own financial obligations, 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s board of directors 
began to consider recapitalization and acquisition 
proposals. Three groups expressed significant interest. The 
first group was led by Samuel Zell, a Chicago real-estate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The partnerships were owned by The Rockefeller Group, Inc. ("RGI"), 
which was in turn owned by the Mitsubishi Estate Co. of Japan and 
Rockefeller family trusts. 
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investor, and included General Electric Company, whose 
subsidiary the National Broadcasting Company leased 
approximately 20% of Rockefeller Center. The second was 
led by Gotham Partners, L.P., an investment firm that held 
5.6% of Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s shares. The 
third group included Whitehall Street Real Estate Limited 
Partnership V, Goldman Sachs & Co., Daniel M. Niedich 
and David Rockefeller. On August 11, 1995, Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc. entered into a combination 
agreement with the Zell Group, in which the Zell Group 
pledged a $250 million cash capital contribution plus $700 
million in new financing. The agreement also contained an 
escape clause under which Rockefeller Center Properties, 
Inc. could terminate the combination plan and pursue 
another proposal it considered superior. 
 
In the fall of 1995, the Partnerships filed a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan in which they agreed to transfer full 
ownership of Rockefeller Center to Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc. Also in the fall, the Zell, Gotham and 
Whitehall Groups continued to submit additional proposals 
to Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. In September, 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s board rejected the 
Whitehall Group's offer to buy out Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc. for $100 million, an amount that equaled 
$6.50 per share. It also rejected the Gotham Group's $105 
million rights offering proposal. But in November the board 
unanimously approved the Whitehall Group's all-cash 
merger bid of $8.00 per share, believing this offer was 
superior to the Zell Group's final bid, which contained both 
cash and debt components and was valued at $7.65 to 
$7.76 per share.3 At about the same time, Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc., Whitehall and Goldman Sachs 
entered into a rights offering agreement under which 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. would be able to make a 
$200 million public rights offering4 if Rockefeller Center 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Whitehall Group's $8.00 per share bid appears to represent a 50% 
premium over the price of Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. stock before 
the bidding for Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. began. 
4. In a rights offering, an issuer's existing shareholders "are granted 
the 
opportunity (i.e., right) to purchase [a] new offering of shares, usually 
at 
a discount below their current market price."See JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
SECURITIES REGULATION 217 (2d ed. 1997). 
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Properties, Inc.'s shareholders did not approve the 
Whitehall Group's bid. 
 
On February 14, 1996, Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. 
filed a final proxy statement regarding the Whitehall 
Group's proposed merger with the SEC and distributed it to 
shareholders. The proxy statement represented that 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s board believed the 
company might not remain solvent if the merger failed and 
explained that the rights offering might be pursued if the 
merger were rejected. It also stated that the board believed 
the rights offering, even if successful, would not allow 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. to take ownership of 
Rockefeller Center. In addition, the proxy statement 
mentioned an appraisal valuing Rockefeller Center at $1.25 
billion. The appraisal stated that this amount did not 
include any transferable development rights, or air rights,5 
associated with Rockefeller Center because Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc.'s mortgage did not encumber those 
rights. 
 
The proxy statement also contained a detailed description 
of the Whitehall Group's plans if the merger were approved. 
It stated that the Whitehall Group would take title to 
Rockefeller Center and raise at least $430 million in debt 
financing, part of which would be used to repay Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc.'s existing debt. 
 
In addition, the proxy statement contained references to 
possible "credit lease financing" transactions with General 
Electric. Specifically, it described a September 1995 
transaction in which Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In New York City, a real property owner who acquires air rights from 
another property can develop his own property beyond the limits zoning 
laws would otherwise impose. Air rights are created when "owners of real 
property [do] not develop[ ] their property to the full extent" allowed by 
the zoning laws. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 113-14 (1978). Air rights associated with a property designated as 
a landmark--as Rockefeller Center is--have a limited number of possible 
purchasers: the rights may be transferred only to directly adjacent lots 
within the same block, lots directly across the street and any lot that is 
part of a chain of lots under common ownership with the landmark and 
separated from the landmark only by streets. 
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General Electric and a Zell affiliate agreed to modify NBC's 
lease so that Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. could 
obtain credit lease financing6 and referred to the February 
1996 Schedule 13E-3 in which Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc. reported this transaction with the SEC. The 
possibility of a lease modification was also briefly 
mentioned in documents presented to Rockefeller Center 
Properties, Inc.'s board by the company's financial advisors 
and later filed with the SEC. Finally, the proxy statement 
mentioned the possibility of "a credit leasefinancing 
arrangement relating to a lease from, or guaranteed by, GE" 
in connection with the rights offering. It does not appear 
that the proxy statement mentioned whether the Whitehall 
Group contemplated pursuing a lease financing with NBC, 
General Electric or anyone else. 
 
Accompanying the proxy statement were a letter signed 
by Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s president and its 
chairman of the board as well as a letter from the board. 
The first letter described the rights offering agreement, 
stating that Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. had not 
decided whether it would pursue such an offering if the 
merger failed. The second letter stated that the board had 
unanimously approved the merger. 
 
On March 25, 1996, Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.'s 
shareholders approved the merger. Soon thereafter, the 
Bankruptcy Court approved the Partnerships' 
reorganization plan, which transferred Rockefeller Center to 
the Whitehall Group. 
 
On April 23, 1996, Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. 
agreed to sell General Electric the property subject to the 
NBC lease for $440 million, an amount defendants claim 
was equal to the present value of the future payments due 
under the lease. A May 6, 1996 Wall Street Journal article 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. A credit lease financing is a form of asset securitization in which the 
right to receive future lease payments is sold for the present value of 
those payments. See RICHARD R. GOLDBERG, "Commercial Real Estate 
Securitization: Capital Markets Financing for Debt and Equity," 2 
MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 1745 (11th ed.). Foran overview of asset 
securitization, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset 
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994). 
 
                                7 
  
describing the sale mentioned that General Electric and 
NBC had been considering this transaction for over two 
years. In a June 6, 1996 New York Daily News article, an 
NBC executive vice president stated that NBC began 
thinking about the transaction in 1995. 
 
II. 
 
Plaintiffs filed suit on November 15, 1996, claiming that 
defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78aa et seq., 
and SEC rules promulgated thereunder through 
misstatements and omissions in connection with their 
acquisition of Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. Plaintiffs 
made essentially four allegations, two of which they raise 
on appeal: first, that defendants failed to disclose the 
Whitehall Group's intention to sell a portion of Rockefeller 
Center to General Electric, and second, that defendants 
failed to disclose the existence of the air rights and the fact 
that the Whitehall Group would acquire them if its merger 
bid were approved.7 
 
On April 30, 1997, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 
supporting this motion with an affidavit containing, inter 
alia, a 1994 appraisal of Rockefeller Center and newspaper 
articles discussing the 1995 "bidding war" for Rockefeller 
Center Properties, Inc. Defendants also referred to a 
January 1997 affidavit containing several documents 
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. had filed with the SEC. 
Plaintiffs responded to defendants' motion on July 9, 1997, 
submitting the Form 10-K Rockefeller Center Properties, 
Inc. filed with the SEC in 1996, the Form 10-K the 
Rockefeller Center Properties Trust filed in 1997, two 
bankruptcy disclosure statements filed by the Partnerships 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In District Court, plaintiffs also claimed that defendants failed to 
disclose the interest of certain companies in leasing property at 
Rockefeller Center at "premium rates" and alleged that defendants 
"understated the potential alternatives to the merger" with the Whitehall 
Group. The District Court granted defendants summary judgment on 
these claims because it concluded the misstatements or omissions 
plaintiffs alleged were not material. These claims have not been raised on 
appeal. 
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and a transcript from the Partnerships' bankruptcy 
hearings. 
 
On October 7, 1997, the court heard argument on the 
motion to dismiss. Following argument, plaintiffs submitted 
a letter from Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, a New 
York law firm, to the New York City Planning Commission 
regarding the Rockefeller Center air rights. Later, plaintiffs 
also submitted two newspaper articles "discussing the 
interest of several parties in Rockefeller Center." 
 
The District Court issued its ruling on December 7, 1997. 
Because the court had considered "affidavits and other 
evidence submitted by the parties," it converted the motion 
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 
12(b). The District Court granted defendants summary 
judgment with respect to the General Electric sale 
negotiations claim. After suggesting that defendants' 
disclosure may have been sufficient, the court observed 
that "[p]laintiffs offer no proof that defendants knew of the 
details of [the General Electric] transaction at the time of 
the Proxy Statement or the shareholder vote." But the court 
decided it need not resolve either issue because it 
concluded the General Electric transaction was not 
materially different from the potential lease financing 
disclosed in the proxy statement. It reasoned that because 
both a sale and a lease financing provide an "immediate 
source of cash," they are economically identical. It added 
that because General Electric's general interest in 
Rockefeller Center was "well-known," the details of the 
potential transaction were not material. Finally, the court 
noted that General Electric was a rival bidder but did not 
offer more than the Whitehall Group, a fact which 
suggested to the court that no reasonable shareholder 
would have considered the potential sale of part of 
Rockefeller Center important in deciding how to vote on the 
merger. 
 
The District Court refused to grant defendants summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' transferable development rights (air 
rights) claim. Finding the proxy statement did not disclose 
that Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. would acquire the 
air rights when it acquired Rockefeller Center, the court 
then examined whether this omission was material. The 
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court determined it could not conclude the air rights were 
immaterial because it had no evidence to support 
defendants' claims that the air rights were either impossible 
to value or of minimal value. 
 
On December 23, 1997, plaintiffs moved for reargument 
or, in the alternative, for certification for interlocutory 
appeal, claiming the District Court had improperly 
converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment. They also filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit documenting 
their need for discovery. On March 4, 1998, defendants 
moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' air rights claim. 
They supported this motion with affidavits from Robert Von 
Ancken, a real estate appraiser who had appraised 
Rockefeller Center in 1994, and Norman Marcus, former 
general counsel to the New York City Planning Commission 
and author of many laws governing air rights. Von Ancken 
explained his appraisal of Rockefeller Center had ascribed 
no value to the air rights because the "possibility they 
would be sold for value was too remote and speculative." He 
added that only one site--Rockefeller Plaza West--could 
feasibly make use of the air rights and explained that 
Rockefeller Plaza West could obtain air rights from a 
number of properties other than Rockefeller Center. Based 
on these facts, Von Ancken stated the air rights were worth 
at most $8.5 million. Marcus agreed that Rockefeller Plaza 
West was the only practical receiving site for the air rights. 
 
Plaintiffs responded with three declarations of their own. 
Michael Ryngaert, a professor of finance and former senior 
economist at the SEC, explained the air rights could be 
valued using methods employed to price stock options and 
concluded the omission of the air rights and the sale 
negotiations with NBC were, when combined, materially 
misleading. Mary Beach, a former senior associate director 
with the SEC, agreed with Ryngaert's assessment. Peter 
Korpacz, a real estate appraiser, valued the air rights at "at 
least $30 million" and disputed Von Ancken and Marcus's 
conclusion that a number of sites could transfer air rights 
to Rockefeller Plaza West. 
 
On July 10, the District Court declined to reverse its 
decision to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment. The District Court also rejected 
 
                                10 
  
plaintiffs' claim they had not received notice of conversion 
as required by Rule 12(b) and Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 
340 (3d Cir. 1989), although without explanation. The court 
then granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
the air rights claim. After reviewing all the evidence, the 
court observed the highest value assigned to the air rights 
was a newspaper article's $42 million estimate. The court 
stated that even this number was small when compared to 
Rockefeller Center's $1.2 billion value and therefore 
concluded that "no reasonable trier of fact would conclude 
[the failure to mention the air rights was] a material 
omission." 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
III. 
 
Because the plaintiffs asserted claims under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the District Court had 
federal question jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. S 78aa and 28 
U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
IV. 
 
There are two issues on appeal: whether the District 
Court's conversion of the motion to dismiss was proper with 
respect to plaintiffs' General Electric negotiations claim8 
and whether the District Court correctly concluded the 
failure to disclose that the Whitehall Group would acquire 
Rockefeller Center's transferable development rights (air 
rights) was not material. Both issues are subject to plenary 
review. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods. Inc., 930 
F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1991) (plenary review on decision to 
convert); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 433 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (plenary review on a grant of summary 
judgment). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The propriety of conversion with respect to the air rights claims is 
not 
at issue. The District Court did not grant summary judgment on those 
claims as the result of conversion but because of defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
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A. Conversion 
 
1. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides that if on a 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss 
 
       matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
       excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
       one for summary judgment as provided in Rule 56, and 
       all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
       present all material made pertinent to such a motion 
       by Rule 56. 
 
The process of treating a motion to dismiss as a motion 
for summary judgment is known as "conversion." When 
reviewing a District Court's decision to convert a motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, we typically 
examine three issues: first, whether the materials 
submitted require conversion; second, whether the parties 
had adequate notice of the district court's intention to 
convert; and third, if the parties did not have notice, 
whether the court's failure to provide notice was harmless 
error. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989).9 
 
Although the plain language of Rule 12(b) seems to 
require conversion whenever a district court considers 
materials outside the pleadings, we and other courts of 
appeals have held that a court may consider certain 
narrowly defined types of material without converting the 
motion to dismiss. In In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997), we held that a court 
can consider a " `document integral to or explicitly relied 
upon in the complaint.' " Burlington , 114 F.3d at 1426 
(quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 
(1st Cir. 1996)). And in PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., 998 
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), we decided that a district 
court may examine an "undisputedly authentic document 
that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to 
dismiss if the plaintiff 's claims are based on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. For a comprehensive discussion of conversion, see 5A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 1366 (2d ed. 
1990 & Supp. 1999). 
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document." The rationale for these exceptions is that "the 
primary problem raised by looking to documents outside 
the complaint--lack of notice to the plaintiff--is dissipated 
`[w]here plaintiff has actual notice . . . and has relied upon 
these documents in framing the complaint.' " See 
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Watterson v. Page, 
987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993)).10 
 
When a District Court decides to convert a motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, it must 
provide the parties "reasonable opportunity" to present all 
material relevant to a summary judgment motion. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b). The parties can take advantage of this 
opportunity only if they have "notice of the conversion." 
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989). In Rose, 
we held that notice must be "unambiguous" and must 
"fairly apprise[ ]" the parties that the court intends to 
convert the motion. Id. at 341-42. We acknowledged that 
notice need not be express to meet these standards but 
recommended that District Courts provide express notice 
when they intend to convert a motion to dismiss. See id. at 
342.11 We also suggested that notice might be provided 
through the court's orders or at a hearing. See id. at 341- 
42. In this case, plaintiffs claim they did not learn of the 
court's intention to convert the motion until it granted 
summary judgment. 
 
2. 
 
We believe the District Court did not provide adequate 
notice of conversion. The record contains no orders 
suggesting the District Court would convert the motion to 
dismiss. Nor did the District Court provide notice at the 
October 7, 1997 hearing on the motion to dismiss. Rather, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. For an analysis of materials courts consider on 12(b)(6) motions, see 
Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Matters Not Contained in the 
Pleadings May Be Considered in Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings Under Rule 12(c) Without Conversion to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 138 A.L.R. FED. 393 (1997). 
 
11. We reaffirm this recommendation because express notice is easy to 
give and removes ambiguities. 
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at the hearing the court repeatedly stated that it was 
deciding a motion to dismiss. See Appendix at 1254 ("If 
[plaintiffs] survive the motion to dismiss . .. ."); id. at 1273 
("I am not saying I am going to deny the motion to 
dismiss."); id. at 1292 ("[I]f I .. . grant the motion to 
dismiss . . . ."); id. (speaking of defendants' motion as "a 
motion to dismiss"); id. at 1294 (speculating on future 
proceedings if "there is a failure in the pleadings . . . .").12 
 
Defendants maintain that plaintiffs had constructive 
notice of conversion because they chose to submit material 
beyond the pleadings.13 We note that some courts of 
appeals have decided a party who submits material outside 
the pleadings is on constructive notice of conversion. See, 
e.g., San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 
470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that when a party 
submits matters outside the pleadings, he has notice 
conversion may occur); Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 
601, 603 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Laughlin v. Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 
1998) (same); Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, 
859 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996) (same). But at least one other 
circuit has required express notice of conversion. See Jones 
v. Automobile Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 1528, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 
1990) (holding that District Court must provide ten days 
"express notice"). Defendants assert we adopted a 
constructive notice approach in Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 
573 (3d Cir. 1996), claiming that Hilfirty holds that a party 
who submits material outside the pleadings "is deemed to 
be on notice that the motion [to dismiss] will be converted." 
We disagree. Hilfirty explicitly states that the "primary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We also note that defendants not only failed to suggest conversion 
was required but instead stated the court was deciding a motion to 
dismiss. See id. at 1272 ("I am quoting the position on a motion to 
dismiss."). Defendants argue that statements made at the October 7 
hearing are irrelevant to the notice issue because plaintiffs submitted 
material beyond the pleadings only after the hearing. But both parties 
submitted material beyond the pleadings before October 7; defendants 
alone submitted twenty-two exhibits totaling more than seven hundred 
pages prior to the hearing. 
 
13. For a discussion of these varying approaches, see 2 JAMES WM. MOORE 
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE P 12.34 (3d ed. 1999). 
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reason" notice was deemed adequate was that some of the 
motions to dismiss had been framed in the alternative as 
motions for summary judgment. Hilfirty, 91 F.3d at 578-79. 
Because defendants' motion to dismiss here was not framed 
in the alternative as a motion for summary judgment, we 
think Hilfirty is inapposite. In addition, the District Court in 
Hilfirty did not expressly and repeatedly state it was 
deciding a motion to dismiss. 
 
3. 
 
A district court's failure to provide notice compels 
reversal unless the failure is harmless error. See Rose at 
342. Failure to provide notice is harmless error if the 
plaintiff 's complaint would not have survived a motion to 
dismiss. See id. In this case the motion to dismiss must be 
informed by the pleading standards of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4 et seq. In the past, 
we have applied the harmless error analysis where we 
determined the parties did not have notice of conversion. 
See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989), Hancock 
Industries v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987); Davis 
Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American Container Corp., 
705 F.2d 705 (3d Cir. 1983). In each case, we were able to 
determine the propriety of dismissal by applying 
established law to relatively straightforward allegations in 
the complaint. Although material beyond the pleadings had 
been submitted, it does not appear to have been 
voluminous or to have raised complex issues of pleading. 
 
When appropriate, a court of appeals may decide a 
motion to dismiss even after conversion. But in cases like 
this one, involving complex principles of law and 
voluminous materials (an 1800-page Appendix), the District 
Court, which is familiar with the record, is better suited for 
this task in the first instance. Furthermore, the motion to 
dismiss here involves interpreting a recently-enacted law-- 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act--whose scope is 
still being defined. In addition, the parties briefed and 
argued their cases prior to our recent decision in In re 
Advanta Corporation Securities Litigation, #6D 6D6D# F.3d ___ (3d 
Cir. 1999), setting forth the pleading standard under 
section 78u-4(b)(2) of the Reform Act. We believe the wiser 
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course is to vacate the grant of summary judgment on this 
claim and remand so the parties have the opportunity to 
frame their arguments in light of this opinion and Advanta. 
 
For these reasons, we will vacate and remand the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' General 
Electric sale negotiations claim. 
 
B. Transferable Development Rights (Air Rights) 
 
Plaintiffs assert that the failure to disclose the existence 
and value of the air rights was a "material omission" 
violating Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9.14 An omitted fact is 
immaterial unless "there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote," TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), and unless its "disclosure . . . 
would have been viewed by the reasonable shareholder as 
having significantly altered the `total mix' of information 
made available." Id. In In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997), we held an 
omission is immaterial as a matter of law if the facts 
omitted "would have had no more than a negligible impact 
on a reasonable investor's prediction of the firm's future 
earnings." In determining the effect of an omission, we 
examine whether the information omitted is speculative or 
unreliable, see In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 
644 (3d Cir. 1989), or if it is contingent. See Lewis v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC underS 10(b), forbids the 
omission of "a material fact necessary in order to make . . . statements 
made . . . not misleading." In order to state a 10b-5 claim based on the 
omission of a material fact, a plaintiff must show"that the defendant i) 
made . . . omissions; ii) of material fact; iii) with scienter; iv) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities; v) upon which the 
plaintiff relied; and vi) that reliance proximately caused the plaintiff 
's 
injury." In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig. , 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d 
Cir. 
1989). 
 
Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC under S 14(a), prohibits the 
solicitation of proxies by means of a proxy statement that contains a 
statement that "is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, 
or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements therein not false or misleading." 
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Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1991). These 
considerations are especially relevant when the information 
omitted is "soft" information, a term which includes 
statements such as estimates and appraisals. See 
Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 642-43. 
 
Plaintiffs claim the District Court erred in determining 
the materiality of the air rights by comparing their value to 
the value of Rockefeller Center. Asserting that knowledge of 
the air rights and their value would have been important to 
a reasonable shareholder's decision on whether to vote for 
the merger, plaintiffs note their expert appraised the air 
rights at "at least $30 million" and that defendants had 
promised to pay shareholders $308 million to complete the 
merger. From these facts they contend a reasonable 
shareholder would have determined that defendants should 
have paid shareholders $30 million more. (This $30 million 
breaks down to nearly eighty cents per share--roughly ten 
percent of price proposed by the Whitehall Group.) 
 
Defendants offer three reasons we should affirm the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment on the air 
rights issue. First, they claim that Rockefeller Plaza West-- 
the only practical receiving site for the air rights--has 
recently been developed without any air rights, which in 
their eyes "prove[s] conclusively" the air rights never had 
any value. Second, they contend they did disclose the 
Whitehall Group would acquire the air rights through the 
acquisition of Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc.; 
specifically, that Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. 
documents filed with the SEC disclosed that Rockefeller 
Center had air rights and the Proxy Statement disclosed 
that the Whitehall Group would acquire Rockefeller Center 
through the acquisition. They contend these documents 
disclosed the impending transfer of the air rights because 
"Rockefeller Center" "naturally includes" the air rights 
associated with it. Finally, defendants maintain the air 
rights were immaterial because their sale was contingent 
and speculative and even the $30 million value proffered by 
plaintiffs was negligible compared to Rockefeller Center's 
$1.2 billion value and would have played no role in the 
reasonable shareholder's voting decision. 
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We need not decide whether $30 million is material when 
compared either to the $1.2 billion value of Rockefeller 
Center or to the $308 million plaintiffs received from the 
Whitehall Group because plaintiffs have provided no 
evidence the air rights would be sold, that the Whitehall 
Group planned to sell them or that one of the possible 
receiving sites had expressed any interest in acquiring them 
at any point in the future. Without such evidence, the value 
shareholders (as opposed to appraisers) would attach to the 
air rights is contingent and speculative, which weighs 
against a finding of materiality. In addition, full disclosure 
of the air rights would have mentioned not only their 
possible value but also the limited prospect they would ever 
be sold. For these reasons, we do not think disclosure of 
the air rights would have been important to a reasonable 
shareholder's voting decision. Therefore we will affirm the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' 
air rights claims. 
 
V. 
 
For these reasons, we will vacate and remand the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' General 
Electric sale negotiations claim but will affirm its grant of 
summary judgment on their air rights claim. We will 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I agree that the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' air rights claims, but 
for reasons different from those relied on by the majority. I 
also believe that although the District Court erred by 
converting defendant's motion to dismiss into one for 
summary judgment, that error was harmless. 
 
A. Air Rights 
 
It is undisputed that the total appraised value of 
Rockefeller Center was $1.25 billion. It is also undisputed 
that 38.2 million shares were transferred during the buyout 
merger and that these shares were transferred at a price of 
$8.00 per share. Further, the Record shows that, viewing 
the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the 
shareholders, the highest possible value for the air rights 
was $42 million. By the following calculations, its"true" per 
share values result:1 
 
       $1.25 billion #45# 38.2 million shares = $32.72 per share 
       $1.25 billion + $42 million = $1.292 billion 
       $1.292 billion #45# 38.2 million shares = $33.82 per share 
 
Taking these figures and using basic ratios and 
proportions, it is clear that the resulting increase in share 
value is approximately 3.25%: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although the shareholders do not dispute the $1.25 billion or the $42 
million figures, they argue that the appropriate comparison for 
materiality is the potential value of the air rights if the shareholders' 
proposed minimum value of $30 million was incorporated into the per 
share value. Thus, they assert that they would not have considered 
$8.00 per share to be a "fair" amount if they knew that the $1.2 billion 
appraisal did not consider the potential windfall of transferring the air 
rights. They suggest that the undeveloped air rights add at least an 
additional $0.78 to the per share value and this 10% increase in value 
is material. However, the shareholders' argument does not take into 
consideration that the $8.00 per share figure does not represent the 
"true" value of Rockefeller Center. Instead, it represents the distressed 
or 
fire sale value. As such, the proper measure of value cannot be 
determined by merely tacking on a hypothetical value of the air rights to 
the $8.00 per share value. 
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       $32.72/share #45# $8.00/share = $33.82/share #45# X 
       X = $8.26/share 
       $8.26/share is a value increase of approximately 
       3.25% over the base value of $8.00/share. 
 
A 3.25% increase in value is immaterial. For this reason, I 
conclude that the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment. 
 
Moreover, the shareholders were placed on notice that 
the air rights were transferable as part of the Buyout 
Merger. The 10k annual reports, which were incorporated 
by reference into the proxy statements, disclosed that the 
air rights were allocable to Rockefeller Center under New 
York law and that under the RCPI mortgages the 
partnership owners reserved the right to transfer these 
rights. See JA 950 (stating that "there is allocable to the 
Property the right to develop up to approximately 2.0 
million square feet of floor areas" that "may be transferred 
to other properties or, with the approval of the New York 
City Landmarks Preservation Commission, used to 
construct additional floor area within the Property," and 
advising that "[t]he Borrower has reserved the right to 
transfer these rights" and "all of the Borrower's rights to the 
air space above the Music Hall, together with easements for 
support, operations and access." The 10k annual report 
also reveals that "as part of the settlement of a lawsuit, 
100,000 square feet of these [air] rights were added to the 
Mortgage."). I therefore conclude that the possible transfer 
of the air rights was properly disclosed to the shareholders. 
 
B. Conversion of the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' General 
       Electric Negotiations Claim 
 
The majority has done a fine analysis, and I agree that 
the District Court improperly converted the motion by 
failing to provide the plaintiffs with adequate notice of the 
conversion. I do not believe, however, that the proper 
mandate is to vacate and remand. Rather, I would inquire 
whether the conversion was harmless error by determining 
whether the plaintiffs' claims could have been dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6). We may affirm a judgment"if it 
appears that there is no set of facts on which plaintiffs 
could possibly recover." Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 
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(3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 
225, 229 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 
It is undisputed that the following documents were 
submitted by the parties either to support, or oppose, the 
motion to dismiss the GE negotiations claim: 
 
       By the shareholders: 
 
       (1) an affidavit of Pamela S. Tikellis authenticating 
       copies of documents incorporated into the proxy 
       statement and amended complaint including RCPI's 
       annual reports for the years 1995 and 1996, filed on 
       SEC Form 10-k 
 
       (2) three filings with the United States Bankruptcy 
       Court for the Southern District of New York (the 
       shareholders requested that the District Court take 
       judicial notice of the bankruptcy court filings) 
 
       (3) two publicly filed letters from the New York City 
       Planning Commission which was obtained under the 
       Freedom of Information Act 
 
       (4) articles from the New York Times dated September 
       10, 1995 and September 12, 1995 
 
       (5) a Form 13D/A filed with the SEC by defendant 
       Goldman Sachs & Co. on May 3, 1996 that was relied 
       upon by the shareholders in their Amended Complaint 
 
       (6) the transcript of a Bankruptcy Court hearing 
       concerning the defaulted owners' Chapter 11 plan 
 
       By the Defendants: 
 
       (1) two affidavits of Robert Payson authenticating 
       copies of a publicly filed Proxy Statement and other 
       SEC filings which the shareholders relied on for their 
       claims 
 
       (2) excerpts from the defaulting owners' Second 
       Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization filed in the 
       bankruptcy court on February 8, 1996 
 
       (3) copies of new articles and other documents 
       mentioned in the shareholders complaint 
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After receiving these various affidavits and other 
 538<!>documents, the District Court converted defendant's 
 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
The general rule is that "a district court ruling on a 
motion to dismiss may not consider matter extraneous to 
the pleadings." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); see also 5A Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 1366, at 93 (West 1990) (observing that Rule 12(b)(6) 
commands a court to convert a motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment "[o]nce the court decided to 
accept matters outside the pleading"). However, we have 
carved out some exceptions to this general rule. For 
example, a " `document integral to or explicitly relied upon 
in the complaint' may be considered `without converting the 
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.' " 
Burlington Coat, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Shaw v. Digital 
Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, 
when an Amended Complaint quotes from certain press 
releases and public announcements, we may consider the 
entire text of those public statements. See Id.  (commenting 
that "plaintiffs cannot prevent a court from looking at the 
texts of the documents on which its claim is based by 
failing to attach or explicitly cite them"); In  re 
Westinghouse, 90 F.3d 696, 707 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
We have also allowed a court to consider matters of 
public record when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). For purposes of a 
motion to dismiss, however, matters of public record do not 
include all documents which may be accessible to the 
public. Rather, it has been limited to the following 
documents: criminal case dispositions such as convictions 
or mistrials, letter decision of government agencies and 
published reports of administrative bodies. See id. at 1197 
(citations omitted). Specifically, we have excluded from our 
definition of public record, for purposes of a motion to 
dismiss, material that "might be subject to disclosure under 
the [Freedom of Information Act]." Id.  The reasoning for 
distinguishing between other recognized public documents 
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and information obtained through the Freedom of 
Information Act is that the public does not have unqualified 
access to these documents; potential obstacles exist. First, 
one must submit a request for the information to a 
Disclosure Officer. See 29 C.F.R. #8E8E # 2603.32-2603.33. 
Second, the request may be denied if the company or entity 
considers the information non-disclosable. See id. 
SS 2603.37-2603.38. Third, many categories of information 
may not be given to the public. See id.SS 2603.17-2603.19, 
2603.21. Finally, a requestor may appeal a denial under 
the Freedom of Information Act. See S 2603.39. Thus, the 
two letters submitted by the shareholders that involved 
correspondence from the New York City Planning 
Commission and that were obtained through the Freedom 
of Information Act cannot be considered on a motion to 
dismiss. 
 
First, I agree with the approach of the Courts of Appeal 
for the Second and Fifth Circuits and would allow the 
District Court to take judicial notice of all public disclosure 
documents which are either required to be filed with the 
SEC or are actually filed with the SEC. See Kramer v. Time 
Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); Lovelace v. 
Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1996). 
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said: 
 
       the documents are required by law to be filed with the 
       SEC, and no serious questions as to their authenticity 
       can exist. Second, the documents are the very 
       documents that are alleged to contain the various 
       misrepresentations or omissions and are relevant not 
       to prove the truth of their contents but only to 
       determine what the documents stated. Third, a plaintiff 
       whose complaint alleges that such documents are 
       legally deficient can hardly show prejudice resulting 
       from a court's studying of the documents 
 
       . . . 
 
       This of course includes related documents that bear on 
       the adequacy of the disclosure as well as documents 
       actually alleged to contain inadequate or misleading 
       statements. We stress that our holding relates to public 
       disclosure documents required by law to be filed, and 
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       actually filed, with the SEC, and not to other forms of 
       disclosure such as press releases or announcements at 
       shareholder meetings. 
 
Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774. This approach is consistent with 
our practice of allowing consideration of indisputably 
authentic documents which serve as the basis for plaintiffs' 
complaint. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 
1196-97 (holding that "a court may consider an 
undisputably authentic document that a defendant 
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the 
plaintiff 's claims are based on the document" because 
"[w]hen a complaint relies on a document . . . the plaintiff 
obviously is on notice of the contents of the document, and 
the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly 
diminished"). 
 
I conclude that the District Court could properly consider 
the authenticated copies of SEC filings submitted by both 
the shareholders and the defendants, which relate to or are 
the basis for the shareholders' complaint, on a motion to 
dismiss. In sum, the documents which are properly 
considered on a motion to dismiss are: 
 
       (1) an affidavit of Pamela S. Tikellis authenticating 
       copies of documents incorporated into the proxy 
       statement and amended complaint including RCPI's 
       annual reports for the years 1995 and 1996, filed on 
       SEC Form 10-k; 
 
       (2) articles from the New York Times dated September 
       12, 1995 and referenced in first Consolidated Amended 
       complaint; 
 
       (3) a Form 13D/A filed with the SEC by defendant 
       Goldman Sachs & Co. on May 3, 1996 that was relied 
       upon by the shareholders in their Amended Complaint; 
 
       (4) two affidavits of Robert Payson authenticating 
       copies of publicly filed Proxy Statement and other SEC 
       filings which the shareholders relied on for their 
       claims; 
 
       (5) copies of news articles and other documents 
       mentioned in the shareholders complaint. 
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Looking at what can be properly considered on a motion to 
dismiss, the District Court's error of conversion is harmless 
because these documents support a dismissal of the 
complaint for failure to state a claim. 
 949<!>A determination of materiality "requires delicate 
 
assessments of the inferences a `reasonable shareholder' 
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of 
those inferences to him." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 450, 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (1976); see 
Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1992). Thus, materiality is often a question for a jury. See 
TSC, 426 U.S. at 450, 96 S. Ct. at 2133. However, when a 
complaint alleging securities fraud contains claims of 
omissions or misstatements that are "so obviously 
unimportant to an investor that reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the question of materiality," we may deem the 
misrepresentations and omissions immaterial as a matter of 
law. In re Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 710; see In re 
Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 641 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
An omission or misrepresentation is material if"there is 
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
`significantly altered the "total mix" of information' available 
to that investor." In re Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 714 
(quoting Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 281 n.11). Thus, the 
shareholders need not prove that disclosure of the allegedly 
omitted facts would have changed their vote regarding the 
buy-out merger. See TSC, 426 U.S. at 449, 96 S. Ct. at 
2132; see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083, 1097-98, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2760-61 (1991). 
 
Further, although information may be relevant and an 
investor may want to know that information, it may be "of 
such `dubious significance' as to be `trivial,' and `hardly 
conducive to informed decision making,' so that to 
reasonable shareholders, such omission must be 
immaterial as a matter of law." In re Westinghouse, 90 F.3d 
at 714 (quoting In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 832 
F. Supp. 948, 972 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (other quotations 
omitted)). Additionally, we have cautioned that when 
plaintiffs allege a claim akin to "failing to predict the future" 
it is often "difficult to ascertain whether the reasonable 
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investor would have considered the omitted information 
significant at the time" especially "where an event is 
contingent or speculative in nature." Shapiro , 964 F.2d at 
283. However, these "opinions, predictions and other 
forward-looking statements are not per se inactionable." In 
re Donald J. Trump Sec. Litig, 7 F.3d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 
1993). Materiality of contingent or speculative information 
or events depends on "a balancing of both the indicated 
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated 
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson , 485 U.S. 224, 
232 (1988)(citations omitted). "If the speaker does not 
genuinely and reasonably believe the opinions, then 
plaintiffs may support a claim for misrepresentation." Id. 
 
In light of our recent opinion in In re Advanta Securities 
Litigation, No. 98-1846, 1999 WL 395997 (3d Cir. June 17, 
1999), plaintiffs alleging a claim under 10b-5 must" `state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference' of 
scienter." Id. at n.5 (quoting 15 U.S.C.S 78u-4(b)(2) (West 
Supp. 1999)). Although this pleading standard was not 
clear at the time plaintiffs filed their complaint, I do not 
believe Advanta requires a remand because plaintiffs' 
claims concerning the GE negotiations cannot withstand a 
motion to dismiss even when the more lenient requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) are applied. Further, 
unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that the"complex 
principles of law and voluminous materials" render the 
District Court "better suited" to determine whether 
plaintiffs' claims survive a motion to dismiss. I suggest the 
record supports the conclusion that the District Court's 
conversion of the motion to dismiss was harmless error. 
 
On appeal, the shareholders raise three main arguments 
to support their contention that the District Court erred by 
granting summary judgment as to the shareholders' claims 
that the Board failed to disclose negotiations involving the 
sale of twenty percent of Rockefeller Center for $440 
million. I will address each argument in turn. 
 
1. Materiality of the Sale Negotiations was a question for 
       the jury 
 
The shareholders argue that they "had a number of 
choices when defendants solicited their proxies." 
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Shareholders' Br. at 35. This is a classic example of "fraud 
by hindsight." As the District Court observed, none of the 
facts presented by the shareholders, indeed, no set of facts, 
support the shareholders' allegations that the Investor 
Group did not disclose material negotiations for the sale of 
a part of Rockefeller Center before the Buy-out Merger vote. 
None of the newspaper articles reveal that firm negotiations 
were underway. Rather, the articles show that at some 
point everything under the sun was being negotiated with 
numerous corporate entities to salvage the financial status 
of Rockefeller Center. Thus, the sale of Rockefeller Center 
was so speculative that it was immaterial as a matter of 
law. 
 
2. The Buy-Out Group's Uncorrected Denial of any Plan to 
       Sell Part of Rockefeller Center in the Next Two Years 
 
The shareholders also contend that Goldman Sachs and 
the defendants had a duty to disclose that they were 
contemplating a sale to GE/NBC especially in light of 
Goldman Sachs's statement that it did not have a plan "to 
sell any or all of the twelve buildings [at Rockefeller Center] 
in the next few years." The District Court correctly decided 
that non-disclosure of potential negotiations was 
immaterial as a matter of law. It is well settled, even 
mandated by SEC regulations, that a company is barred 
from including in proxy materials any tentative negotiations 
or plans, especially when those plans are only speculative. 
Further, this comment by Goldman Sachs cannot be 
attributed to the Investor Group. This statement was made 
on or before September 19, 1995, approximately ten to 
thirteen days before the Investor Group was formed. A 125. 
Therefore, the Investor Group and other defendants did not 
have a duty to update the statements originally made by 
Goldman Sachs. 
 
3. A Sale is not "The Economic Equivalent" of a "Credit 
       Lease Financing Agreement" 
 
The District Court concluded that: 
 
       GE's interest in RCPI and in Rockefeller Center was 
       well known. GE was a member of one of the three 
       major groups bidding on RCPI in the fall of 1995, and 
       GE's involvement in the bidding process was well 
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       documented in the Proxy Statement. Defendants 
       specifically disclosed the agreement between GE, the 
       Zell Group, and RCPI to arrange a `lease financing' 
       based on GE's credit rating. 
 
Charal Invest. Co. v. Rockefeller, Civ. A. No. 96-543-RRM, 
slip. op. at 16 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 1997). The shareholders 
urge that there is a critical distinction between a lease 
financing agreement and a sale to GE/NBC. According to 
the shareholders, a credit lease financing agreement was 
subject to several conditions and "[t]he Proxy Statement . . . 
gave no indication that the cash which could be obtained 
from the credit lease financing would be adequate for RCPI 
to own and operate Rockefeller Center." Shareholders Br. at 
41. The shareholders submit that a sale, in contrast, 
"would have provided an immediate source of cash to RCPI 
without increasing the REIT's debt." Id. at 42. To support 
this argument, the shareholders take a passage from a 
Bankruptcy Court proceeding out of context and attempt to 
persuade this court that the statement, "The economics are 
so different now we ought to look at this from a different 
point of view" allows the "natural inference" that had the 
potential sale to GE/NBC been disclosed, "the cash 
generated by the sale would have sufficed for RCPI to 
assume control of Rockefeller Center without securing 
additional capital form its shareholders or other sources." 
Id. at 43. A full reading of the Bankruptcy proceeding, 
however, shows that this statement was made in 
connection to whether the Debtors' bankruptcy disclosure 
statement to its creditors needed updating.2 
 
Moreover, the proxy materials clearly reveal that GE was 
interested in both RCPI and Rockefeller Center. The record 
shows that GE was part of the Zell Group. Therefore, if 
anyone would be aware of the possible sale of part of 
Rockefeller Center to GE, it would be GE. However, the Zell 
Group did not make a bid higher than the $8.00-$8.75 per 
share bid made by the Investor Group. As such, the District 
Court properly concluded that "no reasonable shareholder 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We can consider the full text of the Bankruptcy proceeding in deciding 
the motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs have relied on various 
excerpts from the proceeding in their complaint. 
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would consider the potential sale of part of Rockefeller 
Center to be important in deciding how to vote." Charal 
Investment Co., Civ. A. No. 96-543-RRM, at 17. 
 
Additionally, the shareholders have not alleged that the 
refinancing agreements with Goldman Sachs were either 
fraudulent or illegitimate in any manner. Therefore, I do not 
believe that remanding the case to provide the parties an 
"opportunity to frame their arguments in light of. . . 
Advanta" is the most efficient, or even a necessary course. 
I would affirm. 
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